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Abstract 
This paper uses a two-part model to measure the asymmetric responses to monetary policy 
surprise in U.S. states from 1970-2012. While there is extensive study in the area of 
monetary theory, there has been limited theoretical discussion surrounding states as 
individual, heterogeneous economies subjected to a monetary system that views them as 
equal parts of the aggregate. In addition, studies that have attempted to model these 
asymmetries face empirical constraints in modeling the root causes of differing state 
effects. We overcome these empirical challenges by using time series methods to produce 
an aggregate vector autoregressive model measuring the determinants of monetary policy. 
We feed this model into a state-level panel data model as an exogenous shock to state 
economies, finding that monetary surprise leads to lower growth in state economic activity. 
We find that states have statistically different reactions to monetary shocks, with states in 
the Great Lakes region being most sensitive to unexpected changes in monetary policy. 
Differences in industry composition, state fiscal policy, and business size do not 
substantively or significantly influence a states’ response to policy. Instead, we find that 
reactions are mostly determined as a result of their regional geography, providing support 
for limited regional monetary autonomy in district banks. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and the extraordinary central bank actions 
that followed, U.S. monetary policy has risen to the forefront of economic research and 
policy discussion. The federal funds rate, the primary tool of conventional monetary policy, 
has taken a backseat since hitting zero in December of 2008. Once at this zero lower bound 
(ZLB), the federal funds rate could not be pushed lower. To accommodate this constraint 
while continuing to cushion the economy, the Federal Reserve expanded the use of tools 
such as quantitative easing and forward guidance in order to achieve policy objectives. The 
current monetary environment and the shift in policy setting inspires the question of 
whether unexpected changes in monetary policy are able to impact the U.S. economy. In 
addition, we question whether these effects are evenly distributed across the country. Due 
to the diverse nature of state economies, demographics, and industry compositions it is 
likely that monetary shocks are not the same after broken down by state. 
Several empirical studies, most notably a series of papers by Carlino and DeFina 
(1998, 1999), have attempted to trace the impacts of monetary policy shocks throughout 
different U.S. regions and states in order to capture the differences between the dispersion 
of monetary shocks across time. They all find evidence supporting the idea that a “one size 
fits all” policy has varying impacts across states. However, these studies were conducted 
before the most recent financial crisis, therefore missing an interesting and historically 
noteworthy time period.  
In addition, these studies are typically tested using state-specific vector 
autoregressive models that separately model monetary shocks responses. We utilize a 
different empirical methodology to retest these hypotheses in a way that allows us to more 
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easily compare the differences between states statistically, while also allowing us to 
explore the causes of asymmetries. We deviate from the literary precedent by modeling the 
states effects as panel data instead of relying on local projections, making our model more 
flexible and our results more robust through the ability to capture cross-state co-
movements and restrictions. We identify state-level characteristics that are believed to 
augment or diminish the effects of policy surprise with the aim of explaining the root 
causes of the asymmetries. We hope our empirical modification will let us contribute to 
literature by quantifying the channels through which monetary policy is believed to impact 
states. This research will be useful for policy setters and economic theory more broadly 
because it traces the unintended side effects of setting monetary policy. In addition, it can 
help to better inform states and allow them to anticipate and counteract monetary shocks 
using state-level fiscal and monetary policy.  
The paper is structured as follows: we begin with a literature review  (Section 2), 
and then outline our aggregate economic model in which we detail the theory and 
methodology for measuring monetary policy (Section 3). The state-level model follows and 
we discuss the theory and empirical methodology utilized in measuring the state level 
impacts of monetary policy (Section 4).  We then outline results (Section 5) and conclude 
with a summary of findings and policy implications (Section 6). All figures and tables can be 
found in the Appendix at the end of the document. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Brief Introduction and Literary Context 
Existing literature suggests that aggregate monetary policy has asymmetric effects 
at the regional and state level due to the heterogeneity within respective regions and 
states. Carlino and DeFina (1999) measure regional impacts of monetary policy using a 
structural VAR model to determine each state’s individual response to monetary policy 
over time. This research is the first to use the VARs empirical method to account for 
interrelationships and feedback shocks through time series analysis in a study observing 
regional impacts of monetary policy. The study identifies asymmetries in the responses 
across states through local projections, and further attempted to explain these differences 
by identifying different mixes of industries, firm sizes, and bank sizes within each state. 
This paper is our main basis for extension; however, we seek to improve a measure of 
monetary policy during and after the financial crisis by using methods pioneered by 
Tallman and Zaman (2012) and Wu and Xia (2014).  
 
2.2 Measuring Policy Post-Financial Crisis  
 Literature suggests that the federal funds rate is the best measure of monetary 
policy in “normal” times (Leeper, Sims, Zha, 1996); however, it is not a sufficient measure 
in the ZLB period because it does not function as the Fed’s primary policy tool. Several 
studies have attempted to redefine monetary policy in post-crisis times. During the 
financial crisis, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate to stimulate the 
economy. However, the rate hit near zero around October 2008 and was unable to go much 
lower. Tallman and Zaman (2012) forecast what the federal funds rate should be if it were 
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able to go negative; in essence, they show what policy should be if the central bank could 
use the federal funds rate as its only signal of policy. Their study regresses the federal 
funds rate in pre-crisis times from 1960-2006 against economic indicators thought to be in 
the central banker’s information set when setting policy, akin to the Taylor Rule1. Then, 
they use that model to forecast what the rate would be if the federal funds rate could go 
negative, based on values of these indicators in the post-crisis period. The study finds that 
the actual policy stance would have been as low as -5 percent in 2008 in the midst of the 
financial crisis. This demonstrates that monetary policy was actually active and 
expansionary during the crisis even though its main tool has been rendered impotent. 
Essentially, the new unconventional policies are expansionary and show up as negative 
pseudo rates. 
 Wu and Xia (2014) dub a similar pseudo interest rate “shadow rates.” The shadow 
rate signifies what the stance of policy would be if the interest rate could possibly fall 
below zero. The study asserts that the shadow rate is the true stance of monetary policy, 
similarly to the Tallman and Zaman study. However, this paper went further and 
demonstrated that the economy experiences real effects from the shadow rate, despite the 
fact that the actual interest rate is zero.  
In order to prove that the shadow rate affected the economy more than the ZLB 
federal funds rate, Wu and Xia conducted a hypothesis test to determine whether the 
parameters relating the shadow rate to macroeconomic variables during crisis and post-
crisis times were the same as the parameters relating the federal funds rate to 
                                                        
1 This well-known study determines that monetary policy can best be predicted by output, inflation and the 
deviation from inflation targets and output targets (Taylor, 1993). This rule will be fleshed out further in 
Section 2. 
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macroeconomic variables in a period of conventional policy. They were unable to reject this 
hypothesis, demonstrating that shadow rates during the crisis period function in the same 
way that the federal funds rate does in normal times. In addition, they also conducted the 
test using the ZLB interest rates during the crisis compared to the interest rates during 
normal times, both in relation to the macroeconomic variables of their respective time 
periods. The authors rejected the hypothesis that the zero-bound rates functioned in the 
same way that the interest rate typically functions in normal times, demonstrating a 
structural break in the federal funds rate during the financial crisis. As a result, this study 
asserted that the shadow rate is a more appropriate measure for monetary policy than the 
actual federal funds rate over the crisis and post-crisis period. It is likely that this shadow 
rate more appropriately captures non-traditional components of policy, such as 
quantitative easing and forward guidance. Therefore, it is this shadow rate that more 
accurately reflects and then affects the economy. We will replicate a version of this shadow 
rate derivation in this paper, which we dub “pseudo rate”.  
 
2.3 Monetary Policy Surprise 
 The real effects of monetary policy are generally measured by treating the residual 
component of monetary policy as an exogenous shock impacting the macroeconomy. This 
operates under the assumption that the systematic component of policy, or the part that is 
predictable via macroeconomic indicators, cannot have surprise effects on the economy 
since the policy itself was set as a direct result of these same variables. Using the systematic 
portion of policy would prevent the ability to make a causal claim due to the endogeneity 
through which the policy was set. In order to circumvent this issue, papers generally treat 
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the residual element of policy, or the portion of the federal funds rate that cannot be 
explained by economic variables in the central banks information set, as the component 
having causal effects (Christiano et al, 1998).  
Some of this residual variance can be attributed to differing ideology and 
preferences of central bankers themselves and the distinctive methods through which they 
interpret the economic data. While most economists treat monetary policy shocks as 
exogenous and determined through the idiosyncratic component, a smaller body of 
economists assume that even systematic monetary action can have causal, explanatory 
impacts on the economy. A study by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) claim that even 
anticipated elements of endogenous monetary policy can explain the economy, in this case, 
through the channel of oil shocks. Though there is a body of literature following this line of 
theory, this paper will measure monetary shocks through the residual component due to 
the endogeneity problems highlighted above. 
 The most heavily explored theory in the literature for how to measure monetary 
policy shocks is the Federal Reserve’s feedback rule, which operates under the 
recursiveness assumption. This assumption states that the residual component of policy is 
orthogonal to the real variables and that any Fed action results in a one period time lag, or 
“impact lags” (Christiano et al, 1998). All indicators in the central bank’s information set 
can impact monetary policy and monetary policy surprise contemporaneously, but 
monetary policy surprise can only affect these same variables in the subsequent time 
period such as articulated by Leeper Sims and Zha (1996) and Carlino and DeFina (1999).   
 
2.4 Channels for Monetary Shock Responses 
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Other papers, most notably Carlino and DeFina (1998) have examined the reasons 
that states respond differently by matching states that react strongly to monetary shocks to 
features making the state unique. They focus on three main channels through which shocks 
are likely intensified. The first focuses on industry mix, with the theory being that states 
relying on industries with high interest rate elasticities, such as manufacturing, would be 
more prone to suffering from monetary shocks. Secondly, they hypothesized that broad 
credit channels such as bank loans represented another channel through which shocks 
could differentiate. For example, small businesses would face difficulty adjusting to 
monetary shocks due to an information mismatch and higher marginal costs of external 
financing. As a result, they theorized that states with many small firms would suffer more 
from policy surprise. Finally, they predict that smaller banks that are less able to alter their 
balance sheets after a policy shock would be more likely to suffer. Therefore, states with a 
greater percentage of small banks would be less able to recover from a policy shock.  
In order to test these theories, Carlino and Defina trace out the effects of a monetary 
policy shock in a regional VAR model to test the relationship between policy and personal 
income in each state. They found that the Great Lakes region, which relies more heavily on 
manufacturing, was most sensitive to monetary policy shocks. However, because their 
empirical model does not jointly measure manufacturing, business size, or bank size, it is 
unclear whether these channels are statistically important and whether they are the true 
root causes of the correlation. This type of analysis presents many challenges that we hope 
to ameliorate. This study was also limited due to its lack of state level data, instead only 
measuring at the regional level, which eliminates the nuanced distinctions between 
individual state economies. 
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2.5 Conclusions Drawn from Literature Review 
Due to the literature which suggests that monetary policy cannot be measured by 
the federal funds rate during the crisis period and that a forecasted interest rate has real 
effects on the economy, this paper will seek to construct a unique measure of a pseudo-
interest rate post crisis, based largely upon the Tallman model. Since Wu and Xia 
demonstrated the real effects of the pseudo-rate in the aggregate, this paper will use the 
pseudo-interest rate to test the impacts at the state level hoping to test the same theories 
as the study by Carlino and DeFina. Monetary policy residuals will be treated as an 
aggregate monetary policy shock impacting each state with a one-period time lag. 
However, we deviate from the literary tradition of local projections set by Carlino and 
Defina in order to test the channels of asymmetry in one model. 
   
3. Aggregate Model— Measuring Monetary Policy 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 In this section, we formulate a measure of monetary policy that will function as the 
independent variable of interest in our empirical model. We begin with a discussion of 
monetary theory, describing the goals of the central bank when setting rates and the 
information it sees when doing so. Drawing from literature, we construct an empirical 
model for monetary policy based upon a system of aggregate macroeconomic equations. 
However, we admit that this model is not appropriate after 2008, so we modify the federal 
funds rate in this period to reflect the relationships in place prior to the financial crisis. 
With a policy variable that more accurately reflects monetary policy throughout our entire 
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time period of interest, we run an aggregate VAR model of the entire aggregate 
macroeconomic system. We define the residual from this model to be the exogenous 
aggregate monetary surprise shock that we use in our study. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Foundations for Monetary Policy Setting  
The basis of the theoretical model for measuring monetary policy channels comes 
largely from the Taylor Rule, a reactionary monetary policy-forecasting model at the 
forefront of economic theory (Taylor, 1993). This model treats the Federal Reserve as an 
actor attempting to optimize its dual mandate, minimizing unemployment while 
maintaining price stability. 
    𝑟 =  𝜋 +  .5(𝑌 − 𝑌∗) +  .5(𝜋 − 𝜋∗) + 𝑟∗   (1) 
This simplistic rule was used to predict the federal funds rate during the period from 1984-
1992 over which Taylor based his study. The model in this paper will expand on this rule 
by increasing the information set of the central bank to include other economic indicators 
(e.g., unemployment rate, money supply, government spending), in a manner similar to 
Tallman and Zaman (2012) and Bernanke, Boivin and Piotr (2003). In modifying this 
theoretical model, we assume the Federal Reserve seeks to minimize a loss function that 
includes, but is not limited to, deviations of output from its potential and inflation volatility: 
setting interest rates such that prices are stable and unemployment is kept low, in the 
context of output growth. However, there is the constraint that the nominal interest rate, or 
policy rate, has a lower bound of zero: 
    𝑚𝑖𝑛 [𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝜋, 𝑌; 𝑍)]      𝑠. 𝑡.    (𝑟 > 0)    (2) 
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 where loss(.) is a function of deviations of output (Y) and inflation (π) from their targets. 
The variable Z is meant to capture all other economic indicators that the Federal Reserve 
sees when setting policy.  
 
3.3 Aggregate Model Data: Sources and Transformation Techniques 
All of the aggregate-level data used in the subsequent models comes from FRED, the 
economic data produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use seasonally 
adjusted quarterly variables from 1960-2015. The variables included are real GDP, CPI, 
unemployment rate, M22, federal-level government spending, and the federal funds rate. 
For the indicators reported on a monthly basis (all except for GDP), a three-month average 
was taken in order to convert the measures to quarterly. GDP, CPI, M2, and government 
spending are all inputted as a quarter-by-quarter change in the log of each variable. This 
growth model creates stationary data that does not grow over time, an assumption of the 
model. Since the federal funds rate and the unemployment rate are reported as rates, we do 
not find it necessary to transform these variables. However, we use the stationary 
transformations for the other variables in the model. Unit root tests to confirm that the 
variables are appropriately measured as stationary can be found in Table 1. We graph both 
non-stationary and stationary series for each variable in Appendix B. 
 
3.4 Defining the Policy Model 
In order to define the monetary policy rule that the central bank operates under 
when setting policy, we will expand the classic Taylor rule information set to include 
                                                        
2 For M2 I use the only available non-seasonally adjusted series. 
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unemployment rate and government spending; GDP, inflation and unemployment rate will 
be endogenous, while government spending3 will be treated as a component exogenous to 
the model, but relevant to the Fed’s information set. We are treating government spending 
as an exogenous variable because fiscal and monetary officials do not coordinate actions, 
but previous fiscal policy is an element that the Federal Reserve sees when setting policy. 
Because it is an exogenous variable, government spending will not need its own equation in 
the system. In addition, we operate under the assumption that the central bank has 
backward looking but rational expectations, as explained by the Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993). 
As a result, four quarterly lags, a full year of information, are built into the model for all 
variables {GDP, inflation [π], unemployment rate, federal funds rate, and government 
spending}. The system of equations will function as such: 
  𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 =   𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋, 𝑈𝑅, 𝐹𝐹𝑅]𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑓[𝐺]𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑅   (3.1) 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋, 𝑈𝑅, 𝐹𝐹𝑅]𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑓[𝐺]𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃    (3.2) 
   𝜋𝑡 = 𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋, 𝑈𝑅, 𝐹𝐹𝑅]𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑓[𝐺]𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜋    (3.3) 
   𝑈𝑅𝑡 = 𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋, 𝑈𝑅, 𝐹𝐹𝑅]𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑓[𝐺]𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑡
𝑈𝑅     (3.4) 
Aggregate indicators are related by function f, which we assume to be linear, at time period 
“t” where j=1…4. Based on our timing restriction, that monetary policy affects the economic 
variables with lags built out to four quarters, we can replace the error term of each 
equation (GDP, inflation, and UR) into the FFR equation as a contemporaneous measure of 
each, rendering our forecasting measure of monetary policy as,  
                                                        
3 For robustness, we compared results using both lagged and contemporaneous levels of government 
spending, only lagged, and only contemporaneous—all three methods led to similar conclusions. Since the 
results did not largely vary, we chose to only input this variable as a one-quarter lag in accordance with the 
assumption that the Fed cannot coordinate with government in the period of policy setting, but can only see 
spending from the previous period. 
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 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 =   𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋, 𝑈𝑅, 𝐹𝐹𝑅]𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑓[𝐺]𝑡−1 + 𝑓[𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝜋 , 𝑈𝑅]𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹?̂?    (4) 
This substitution adds contemporaneous measures of each variable in the system, 
excluding exogenous government spending. This Taylor-like equation assumes the central 
bank also sees the contemporaneous values of GDP, inflation, and unemployment rate 
when setting policy, which isolates the error term, 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹?̂?  . As a result, the error term in our 
model only reflects the idiosyncratic component coming from monetary policy. 
 
3.5 Forecasting Policy During Financial Crisis Period 
 3.5.1 Modeling Methods 
As the literature suggests, the federal funds rate functions as an appropriate 
measure of policy before the financial crisis in the years 1960-2006. However, from 2007-
2015, the federal funds rate is constrained at zero while monetary policy is not, as 
demonstrated by unconventional policy tools used during the crisis. In order to define a 
measure of policy that is more appropriate during the ZLB period, we mimic the Tallman 
and Zaman study by using the model listed in equation 4 to run a simple multivariate 
regression from the years 1960-2006. This model demonstrates how the Federal Reserve 
reacts to economic indicators when setting policy in “normal” times. The regression output 
can be found in Table 3. Using these coefficients, a policy forecast that we term the “pseudo 
rate” is built for the crisis period 2007Q1-2015Q3 in order to demonstrate the true 
monetary policy stance during this time period, in accordance with the evidence from 
Tallman and Zaman and Wu and Xia studies. Therefore, the “monetary policy rule”, a 
modified measure of the federal funds rate, can be redefined to reflect the federal funds 
rate as follows, 
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 𝑀𝑃𝑅(𝑡) =  {
𝐹𝐹𝑅,                           𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < 2007
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,            𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ 2007
   (5) 
 
 3.5.2 Evaluating Monetary Policy Rule 
This policy forecast demonstrates that the pseudo interest rate would be negative at 
the height of the crisis (Appendix A Figure 1). The results of this forecast demonstrate that 
even though the interest rate was bound at zero, the real approach to monetary policy was 
negative and therefore more accommodative. The predicted rate follows the actual rate 
very closely until the third quarter of 2008 where the pseudo rate reaches as low as -3.9 
percent. Our forecast is slightly less negative than Wu and Xia and Tallman and Zaman 
because it incorporates only aggregate policy measures instead of financial measures since 
we have decided to expand the Taylor Rule using only macro indicators4.  
In order to offer evidence for why our pseudo rate and actual rate diverged, we 
regressed the difference between these two rates against two dummy variables indicating 
the dates in which QE were announced and when Forward Guidance occurred and the ten-
year treasury rate. Even through the limited scope of dummy variables that are unable to 
quantify the magnitude of these programs, 11.42 percent of the difference between the 
pseudo rate and the actual rate can be explained by these unconventional policy measures. 
If we had better measures of the unconventional crisis policy, it would likely explain the 
difference even more completely. 
 
3.6 Monetary Policy Shock 
 3.6.1 Extracting Monetary Policy Surprise 
                                                        
4 A possible expansion to consider would be adding in more yield-curve indicators. 
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Because the literature suggests that the economy does not react to the systematic 
changes in policy, but the changes that are a surprise, we will use a VAR model to identify 
the monetary surprise shock in the aggregate. VAR models are traditionally used in 
macroeconomic research due to the models ability to track relationships between 
interwoven variables throughout time. The VAR we use to measure the system of equations 
defined in equation 2 functions as follows, 
  𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖
𝑗
𝑘=1 𝑍𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜈𝑡       𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 , 𝑗 = 1 … 4   (6) 
Where Zt  =  (z1,t, … zm,t) is an m×1 set of  variables, α is a constant, Φi are  m×m matrices 
of coefficients, and 𝜈𝑡 is an m×1 idiosyncratic error term comprised of 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹?̂? , 𝜀𝑡
𝜋,  𝜀𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,   
 and  𝜀𝑡
𝑈𝑅 . We use 𝜈𝑡 to isolate 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹?̂? , or monetary policy surprise defined below. 
Using this VAR, we model the impulse response functions between variables in 
vector Z, which include the monetary policy rule (MPR) that we devised and other 
aggregate variables: GDP, inflation, unemployment rate, money supply5, and government 
spending. We ran the VAR with four lags, allowing one year of feedback between variables. 
Using cholesky decomposition6 VAR as first used by Sims (1980), we can simulate the 
responses in a system of intercorrelated variables and decompose the coefficient matrix 
residuals. In doing so, we determine the effect of a one standard deviation change in the 
monetary policy rule and its impact on macroeconomic variables for 20 periods.  
                                                        
5 We choose to include money supply in the VAR model in order to see how monetary policy changes the 
money supply. However, we omitted it from the FFR forecasting model because we believe that the causal 
process is such that the previous shifts in money supply do not affect future needs to alter the interest rate. 
Instead, money supply is an outlet through which monetary policy is administered. 
6 This method does not come without challenges; it relies largely on the ordering of the variables to 
determine its success. Based on our theory (that monetary policy is determined by contemporaneous 
variables, but can only affect these aggregate terms with a one period lag), we have chosen to place the 
monetary policy pseudo rate last amongst the variables. Reordering the first five variables demonstrated 
little difference. 
Fite 18 
As explained in the literature, we run this VAR because we are most interested in 
the portion of policy that the model is unable to predict, operating under the theory that 
only the idiosyncratic component will produce causal effects on the economy. Essentially, 
monetary policy surprise represents times where the Federal Reserve set policy in a way 
that cannot be explained by the traditional information set. Therefore, our policy variable 
of interest in this paper is not the federal funds rate itself, but the models’ residual error 
term. For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this series as “monetary policy 
surprise” or “MPS”, such that 𝜀𝑡
𝐹𝐹?̂?   =  MPS𝑡. 
It is necessary to assume that monetary policy surprise is uncorrelated with any 
macroeconomic variables we have included within the model. MPS is unrelated to the 
economy, but instead can be explained through individual central banker ideologies, 
unexpected shifts in Fed goals, etc. Due to the non-economic nature of this measure, it is an 
appropriately exogenous shock to the economy that cannot be predicted. 
 
3.6.2 Evaluating Monetary Policy Surprise 
After running the aggregate-level VAR (Table 4), we model the impulse response 
functions to observe the relationship between all of the inputs. The impulse response 
graphs can be found in Figure 2. These responses fit it with theory, indicating that an 
increase in the federal funds rate will affect aggregate variables in the short term, but have 
no long-term effects due to the neutrality of money. In addition, all reactions begin at 0, 
indicating that monetary surprise has no contemporaneous effect. When raising the 
interest rate, the unemployment rate increases, GDP decreases, and the money supply 
constricts. While we would expect CPI to fall as a result of lowered demand, it increases 
Fite 19 
here due to the price puzzle (Balke 1994). This could likely be remedied by incorporating 
another price measure such as commodities, but correcting this phenomenon is not 
incredibly relevant to this study, however it could be the source of a future extension. 
After extracting the residual from this VAR, we model the surprise component of 
policy setting that could not be explained by aggregate inputs (Figure 4). We observe large 
jumps in surprise in the mid 1970’s from the oil crisis, in the 1980’s due to a change in the 
way the Fed targets, the 2008 financial crisis, and the change in oil prices in 2015. This 
residual will be the independent variable of in interest in the state level model. 
 
4. State-Level Model 
4.1 Theoretical Reason for Examining State-Level Responses 
 In the context of this study it is important to realize that only aggregate variables 
enter into the central bank’s loss function; no state- or regional-level factors are taken into 
consideration when the FOMC meets to determine the level of the federal funds rate. 
Therefore, each state and region is seen as homogenous when monetary policy is being set. 
However, given the differences in state compositions, we are interested in how a “one size 
fits all” policy impacts a heterogeneous set. Since we are operating under the assumption 
that any surprise changes in monetary policy affect aggregate economic variables, though 
with a one-quarter lag7, this shock will also impact individual state-level economic 
measures since states comprise the aggregate economy. As a result, we can use the residual 
from the aggregate model (MPS) and feed it into the state-level model as an exogenous 
shock.  
                                                        
7 We assume a one-quarter lag because our VAR impulse response model indicates that monetary policy does 
not have a strong contemporaneous effect, but it does influence subsequent periods. 
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 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑓[𝑊]𝑠,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑠,𝑡   (7) 
Where state output and employment are a function of vector W of state-specific variables 
and characteristics and the aggregate monetary policy surprise shock. Subscript “s” 
denotes each state and “A” denotes an aggregate shock common to all states. “t” denotes 
the time period with j=1…4.  
 We hypothesize that state economies will have statistically different reactions to a 
monetary policy shock. The theoretical model primarily comes from literary precedent, 
which has suggested that monetary policy impacts the economy through two main 
channels. The first is industry mix; states that heavily rely on industries that are interest-
rate dependent will be more sensitive to unexpected monetary shocks (Carlino and DeFina 
1998). Manufacturing is particularly affected by changes in monetary policy, as interest 
rates influence equipment, production, and investment decisions. The financial sector, 
which relies on interest rates for banking activity, may also suffer from unexpected changes 
in policy. The second, broad credit channels, suggest that interest rate changes can impact 
the business landscape of a state through their bank loans. Large businesses typically have 
better resources to deal with loan refinancing in the event that rates shift unexpectedly. 
Small businesses on the other hand, typically have more difficulty and higher costs 
associated with refinancing their loans. We decide against studying Carlino and DeFina’s 
third channel, bank size, due to the challenge of finding data that is measured consistently 
across all states while also showing variation across time and states8. In addition to the two 
major channels theorized in the literature, we also expect that differences in state fiscal 
                                                        
8 We attempt to use a commercial bank loan and lease income dataset from FRED, but find limited variation 
across states. We run the model with this variable as a robustness check, but find no significant relationship. 
Therefore, we opt against using this measure as we worry it dilutes the strength of other indicators. 
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policy can influence the way that a monetary shock dispels; or at the very least, we want to 
control for state fiscal policy in order to disentangle fiscal and monetary shock effects. 
 As a second hypothesis unique to this study, we examine the possibility that the 
severity of the shock is also dependent upon whether the shock begins “below predicted” 
or “above predicted”, thereby distinguishing two different types of monetary surprise. 
Since the measure is centered on the endogenous prediction of policy, if the shock 
originates below the predicted line, the monetary shock becomes contractionary following 
a surprise expansion. However, if the shock originates above the predicted line, an already 
contractionary shock becomes increasingly contractionary. Macroeconomic theory 
suggests that any contractionary monetary shock will depress economic activity, so we 
seek to test whether monetary policy shocks are more severe if it originates at a time when 
rates are already higher than anticipated. We hypothesize that the response to the shock 
will be less severe if the shock begins below the predicted line and increases closer toward 
zero, thereby making the magnitude of the surprise smaller. In addition, because the shock 
response is likely larger in an above predicted shock, so too is the variance between state 
responses. This notion is important to test because not only do we seek to identify 
asymmetric responses, but we also attempt to model the conditions under which a 
monetary shock will lead to the largest responses varying the most by state. 
 
4.2 State Model Data  
4.2.1 Sources and Transformation Techniques 
For the state-level model, the state-specific variables of interest include state 
earnings, an employment coincident index, unemployment rate, real personal income, CPI, 
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percent of small firms, medium firms, and large firms in the state, state tax burden rate, 
percent of earnings in manufacturing, finance, and agriculture in the state, commercial 
bank loan and lease income, and population. We only use data from the 48 contiguous 
states, excluding Hawaii, Alaska, and the District of Columbia in order to eliminate outliers. 
The state coincident index includes nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in 
manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by 
the consumer price index. This data produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
was initially a monthly measure from 1979-2015, but we converted it into quarterly data 
using a three-month average. The data was further manipulated into log differences to 
remove the time trend. The unemployment rate data came from FRED for the months 
1976-2015 and was also converted into quarterly through a three-month average. The real 
personal income measure from FRED is quarterly data from 1970-2015. We deflate it by 
population to create personal income per capita, and then use log differences to make it a 
stationary series.  The CPI measure is measured by Census region due to lack of a state-
specific indicator. The data is quarterly and seasonally adjusted from FRED for the years 
1970-2015. We perform log differences on the CPI to convert it into a stationary inflation 
measure. The firm size comes from the U.S. Small Business Association from 1970-2011, 
with “small” indicating firms with less than 20 employees, “medium” with 20-499 
employees, and “large” firms having greater than 500 employees. The data was annual and 
we spliced it into quarterly figures by assuming a constant quarterly growth rate within 
each year. Further, we calculated in percentages by dividing each firm size by total firms. 
The earnings data was annual and comes from Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1970-
2015. We divided the annual data into four quarters by assuming each quarter contributed 
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the same amount to total earnings and sectorial earnings in the year. We divided each 
sector (manufacturing, finance, and agriculture) by total earnings in the state each quarter 
to find a percentage of earnings by sector. Commercial loan and lease income data comes 
from FRED for the years 1970-2014. The data set was quarterly and seasonally adjusted, 
and we deflated it by population before taking log differences. The state tax burden rate 
from the Tax Foundation measures the percentage of state income that residents pay in 
state and local taxes by state. This data was annual from 1977-2012 and we assume 
constant inter-quarter growth rates to splice the data into quarterly measures. The state 
population data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau for the years 1970-2014. Also an 
annual measure, we convert to quarterly by assuming constant inter-quarter growth. 
Population is only used as a means of converting other data into per capita measures. In the 
modeling section, we address concerns about autocorrelation in the data as a result of the 
methodology for manipulating the data in order to maintain consistent time frames. 
Detailed summary statistics and variable graphs can be found in Appendix B and unit root 
tests of stationarity can be found in Table 2. 
 
4.2.2 Data Discussion: Trends 
 For each state-level indicator listed above, line graphs in Appendix B average states 
in each quarter to demonstrate the variable’s trend through time. In economic indicators 
such as personal income, economic activity index, inflation and unemployment rate, the 
data shows major fluctuations around the oil crisis in the 1970’s and the recession in 2008. 
In breaking states down by their earnings composition, it is evident that on average, the 
role of finance has steadily increased over time, despite a large dip around 1995. The 
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importance of both manufacturing and agriculture has decreased throughout time. In terms 
of firm size, the average percentage of small firms has declined, while the presence of large 
firms has increased. State fiscal policy does not seem to present a definitive time trend. 
In addition to time trends, we provide a distributional break down for each 
indicator in select years to demonstrate the state asymmetries that are masked when 
simply viewing aggregate averages across times. Each indicator mimics a semi-normal 
distribution, indicating that all states do not cluster around their means. While the means 
change throughout time, the shape of the distributions shift as well. The distributions for 
personal income and the economic activity index have become narrower throughout time, 
indicating that state asymmetries are less prevalent in the 2000’s compared to the 1980’s 
in terms of these macro variables. Manufacturing and agriculture earnings follow this same 
trend, with more states clustered together around lower values while all states shrink their 
prevalence in these industries. On the other hand, finance earnings have moved in the 
opposite direction; the distributions have widened throughout time as certain states such 
as New York increase their financial sector substantially, skewing the distributions to the 
right and increasing asymmetries. Firm size mostly maintains a similar state distribution 
throughout time. The trends around state differences over time justify our interest in 
examining whether these asymmetries influence policy effects. 
 
4.3 Empirical Methods for Measuring State-Level Effects 
4.3.1 Baseline Model 
With a defined measure of monetary policy surprise, the state-level effects can be 
determined by feeding the lagged monetary policy rule into a panel data set of states. We 
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have chosen to measure state economic activity through the log differenced state 
coincident index. 
 𝛥𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖
𝑗
𝑘=1 𝑊𝑠,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑠,𝑡    (8) 
Where Wm,s,t  =  (w1,1,t, … wm,48,t) and is an m×48 set of state-specific variables by each 
state, α is a constant, Φi are  m×m matrices of coefficients. The set of variables in the state-
specific set indicated by vector W include controls for past economic activity growth, 
inflation, the percent of earnings coming from finance, manufacturing, and agriculture, and 
the percent of small firms and large firms in the state. We lag each variable four times 
(j=1…4) under the assumption that each economic indicator is dependent upon its 
previous periods, up to one year, which all together jointly influence current changes in 
economic activity in a state. Our independent variable of interest, monetary policy surprise, 
enters as an aggregate exogenous shock (with subscript A denoting an aggregate measure 
common to all states) with a one period time lag. Because this variable was created as the 
residual from an aggregate VAR model, it properly controls for aggregate macroeconomic 
data, which would be common to all states. Therefore, any effects on the state economy will 
be specific to the monetary surprise shock, not a result of nationwide economic shocks.  
The restrictions we place on the model are as follows: We use a set of quarterly 
stationary time series data from 1970-20159 divided into 48 state panels. We use an error 
structure allowing for heteroskedasticity among panels. In addition, because the data is 
time series in nature and because we constructed several variables by assuming constant 
inter-quarter growth rates, we allow the error structure to correct for autocorrelation (an 
                                                        
9  While the data are balanced in terms of the panels, several variables begin in as late as 1975 and end as 
early as 2012, limiting the actual regression results to a smaller set of observations and years. 
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AR1 process). This autocorrelation does not need to be panel specific because the same 
methods were applied to all panels and the time trend is also common to all panels. 
While Carlino and Defina (1999) chose to measure these effects with local 
projections on individual states separately, our model functions as one panel data set 
allowing us to run one all-inclusive model instead of 48 separate models. As a result, we 
can quantify the significance of each variable in relation to the others while also comparing 
individual state effects with their t-statistics in one flexible model. Further, because we use 
a linear panel model, we circumvent the need to include the relationships between 
endogenous variables that would be needed in a state-level VAR model. As a result, we can 
exclude personal income, unemployment rate, etc. and narrow inputs to state composition, 
avoiding problems of endogeneity and collinearity.  
 
 4.3.2 Modeling the State Asymmetries 
 In the baseline model, results only demonstrate the effect of policy surprise on an 
average state. In order to model the asymmetric effects of surprise, we enhance the model 
by interacting surprise with state dummy variables as follows. 
𝛥𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖
𝑗
𝑘=1 𝑊𝑠,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑠(𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 ×  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) +  𝜀𝑠,𝑡  (9) 
The control variables in vector W remain the same with a new coefficient matrix Φi, while 
we add in interaction terms for all 48 states, choosing a state with an average response as a 
base state. As a result, γ1 represents the response of a base state, with coefficients in m×m 
matrix ϕ𝑠 representing the deviation of responses from the base. State asymmetries can be 
established by the extent to which differences in the interaction terms are statistically 
significant. 
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 4.3.3 Modeling Potential Channels for Asymmetry 
 In order to measure the causes of asymmetry, we run the model with interactions 
between surprise and variables of industry composition, fiscal policy, and business size.  
𝛥𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖
𝑗
𝑘=1 𝑊𝑠,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1  
   + ∑ 𝜙𝑑
𝑗
𝑘=1 [𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 × (𝑌𝑠,𝑡−1 −  ?̅?)] +  𝜀𝑠,𝑡    (10) 
 
We continue to model the same control variables in vector W, but add in vector Y of 
interaction terms of variables hypothesized to influence asymmetries. All variables in 
vector Y {Percent of earnings in finance, manufacturing, and agriculture, tax burden, 
percent of small firms and large firms, and geographical region} are mean centered over 
time and panel. As a result, γ1 represents the impact of a monetary shock in a state with 
average levels of six interaction variables. ϕd is an m×m matrix of interaction coefficients 
demonstrating the influence of these explanatory variables on the impacts of surprise. A 
positive interaction term would indicate that a high level of that variable depresses the 
effects of the monetary shock, while a negative value would indicate the variables ability to 
exacerbate the shock. The literature suggests that interest-rate dependent sectors such as 
manufacturing and finance and small firms would exacerbate the effects of the shock.  
 
 4.3.4 Modeling the Importance of Shock Type on Asymmetries 
 In the theoretical model, we hypothesized a distinction between whether the 
surprise was a reversal of a negative surprise or an increase in an already positive and 
contractionary shock. In order to test this, we define a binary variable as follows. 
 𝑀𝑃𝑆(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  {
𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑                   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 ≤ 0
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑                   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 > 0
  (11) 
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Once again, a value of zero represents that there is no monetary policy surprise, or that the 
federal funds rate falls exactly at its predicted level. Increasing the series when it is below 
predicted lessens the distance between the actual and predicted values, dampening the 
magnitude of the surprise. Thus increasing the series when it is above the predicted level 
spreads the distance between the actual and predictive values, enlarging the magnitude of 
the surprise. In order to test whether there is a difference between these two, we add the 
dummy variable as an intercept to the regression and interact it with surprise to see 
whether this indicator exacerbates or depresses the impact of increasing surprise. In 
addition, we interact the binary variable with all of the interaction terms from the previous 
model in order to determine whether these interaction effects differ based on the type of 
surprise. 
𝛥𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛿0𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖
𝑗
𝑘=1 𝑊𝑠,𝑡−𝑗 +  𝛾1𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1  ×  𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒) +
∑ 𝜙𝑏
𝑗
𝑘=1 {𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 ×  𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 × (𝑌𝑠,𝑡−1 −  ?̅?)}  + ∑ 𝜙𝑟
𝑗
𝑘=1 {𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 ×  𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴,𝑡−1 ×  (𝑌𝑠,𝑡−1 −
 ?̅?)}  +  𝜀𝑠,𝑡            (12) 
Once again, vector W remains the same control variables with Φi coefficients. We replace 
the constant with an indicator variable with below predicted as the base. Further, in this 
model, γ1 represents the impact of monetary surprise in an “average” state in the base 
region where the shock started below predicted and γ2 + γ1 is the impact of the variables 
above predicted for an average state. The coefficients in matrix ϕb are the interaction 
terms for below predicted shocks, while ϕr is a matrix of interaction terms for above 
predicted shocks. Statistical differences between the two would test whether asymmetries 
are different between the types of shock. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Baseline Results 
The baseline model demonstrates that an increase in monetary surprise leads to a 
proportional decrease in state economic activity growth by .089 units. This finding is 
significant at the 1 percent level, supporting the theory that unexpected positive interest 
rate shocks have significant and harmful effects on the economy. The most substantive and 
significant determinant of current economic activity is past economic activity, as to be 
expected. Past inflation levels were also significant, with high prior inflation leading to 
lower growth in economic activity. The breakdown of large firms and small firms and 
agriculture earnings were also important factors determining future economic activity. 
Finance earnings and fiscal policy did not strongly impact economic activity and 
manufacturing earnings were only significant with a one period lag. As a robustness check, 
the model was also run with state fixed effects and there were no change in the results. As a 
second robustness check, we forecasted the effects of the monetary shock over 20 time 
periods to ensure that this monetary policy surprise has its largest impact in the 
subsequent period after the shock. This graph indicates that the t+1 period shows the 
greatest drop in state economic activity growth, confirming our decision to run the model 
with a one-period lag in the shock variable. This graph can be found in Figure 4 and 
regression results are in Table 5. 
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5.2 Asymmetry Results 
 After running the same model with state specific interaction terms using Florida10 
as the base state, we observe statistically significant differences between the reactions of 
each state. After plotting the distribution of interactions around Florida, it is evident that 
state reactions to a monetary surprise shock follow a fairly normal distribution, though 
somewhat skewed left (Figure 5). This indicates that most states tend to cluster around a 
mean response to the shock, though several outlier states are exceptionally sensitive to 
monetary surprise shocks. Eleven states, {Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia} reacted more 
strongly to the shock in a way that is statistically significant (Table 6). Only Massachusetts 
had a statistically significant reaction that was higher that Florida; however, every state 
was negatively impacted by the shock, with no state seeing greater economic growth as a 
result of contractionary monetary surprise. West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana suffer the 
greatest from a contractionary monetary shock, with West Virginia’s economic activity 
growth proportionally dropping by 0.457 after a 1-unit increase in surprise. This analysis 
provides statistical evidence of asymmetric reactions to monetary shocks, supporting our 
theory that applying one policy to a heterogeneous set of states results in substantive and 
disproportionate effects. We further plot the geographic distribution on a map in Figure 6. 
This map indicates that the most negative responses cluster around the Great Lakes region, 
while the entire Southwest region is relatively well insulated from the shock. As a general 
trend, the east responds more severely to monetary shocks than the west. 
                                                        
10 In order to decide which state should be the base state, the baseline model was run separately for each 
state. The coefficient from Florida was most similar to the average response of -0.089, making Florida akin to 
a state with an “average” response and worthy of comparison. 
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5.3 Asymmetric Determinant Results 
 This model attempts to find the determinants of asymmetry, focusing on state 
composition and geography. We find that state composition interaction effects are 
substantively insignificant and statistically insignificant, aside from manufacturing and 
agriculture that are significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, these interaction terms do 
not move in the same direction that theory would suggest. The Carlino and DeFina papers 
suggest that manufacturing is an interest rate-sensitive industry and thus states with high 
manufacturing sectors would be more hurt by contractionary monetary shocks. However, 
we find that every 1-percentage point increase in manufacturing earnings lessens the 
intensity of the impact of the shock by 0.002 units instead of exacerbating it. In addition, 
the percentage of finance earnings in the state showed little significance. We also found 
results counter to Carlino and DeFina’s theory that firm size affects the magnitude of the 
shock impacts. The coefficients of both small firms and large firms were insignificant and 
their relationships moved in the opposite direction as expected: the percent of small firms 
lessened the shock response and large firms augmented the shock impact. Overall, the 
contributions of state composition to asymmetric monetary effects were relatively 
insignificant. However, it is important to note that firm size and state composition control 
variables were significant to determining a states economic activity but the interaction 
terms indicate that while they are important to determining the states economic health, 
these measure do not affect how a state reacts to a monetary policy shock. 
 While state composition did not explain asymmetries, geography appears to be a 
more significant explanatory factor. We use the Southeast as a base region because it 
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contains Florida, the state used as the base in the previous model. Compared to the 
Southeast, states in the Great Lakes felt significantly more negative effects of the policy 
shocks, with an increase in monetary policy leading to a 0.167 proportional drop in 
economic activity growth. States in the Southwest were least prone to economic activity 
dips due to monetary surprise. An increase in surprise only led to a 0.024 decrease in 
economic activity growth in this region.  
 These findings indicate that states in the Great Lakes region are most susceptible to 
larger drops in economic growth due to contractionary monetary shocks. While these 
states happen to be manufacturing states, it is not their weight in the manufacturing sector 
that leads to this outcome. In fact, the effects of geography were substantively and 
statistically more significant than state composition. This indicates that there are likely 
unobserved factors influencing disparate effects in states that happen to cluster regionally.  
 
5.4 Asymmetry by Shock Type Results 
 This model distinguishes between below predicted origins and above predicted 
increases in the surprise variable, using an average-level state in the Southeast region. The 
results indicate a substantive and significant difference between the impacts of the shock 
depending upon whether it originated below the predicted level versus above the 
predicted level, as indicated by the interaction terms’ significance at the 1 percent level. 
Above trend shocks, or widening the distance between the actual and predicted interest 
rates, are more potent to economic activity, proportionally lowering economic activity 
growth by 0.103 more units than a below predicted shock. While the above predicted shock 
has significantly more negative effects, below trend increases in policy also negatively 
Fite 33 
affect the economy by -0.104 in the Southeast region. These results imply that any 
contractionary policy will dampen economic growth, but that shocks are more 
contractionary when the interest rate starts above where our VAR model predicts it 
‘should’ be. This confirms an important role for both the direction and the magnitude of the 
surprise, or the distance between the actual interest rate and the predicted rate.  
 Aside from the baseline effects of this shock type, we also divided the asymmetric 
determinants by shock type, under the theory that one type of shock may lead to greater 
asymmetries than the other. Distinguishing shock type did not produce significantly 
different surprise interaction terms compared to the previous model when we did not 
interact these terms with shock type. Most terms maintain the same direction and same 
level of significance as the previous model, and compared to each other within the model. 
However, the substantive effects are slightly different between below predicted 
interactions and above predicted interactions for both composition and geography. 
Interaction terms that are below predicted tend to produce smaller interaction effects than 
those that are above predicted. For example, the Great Lakes coefficient is -0.051 when the 
shock is below predicted but -0.081 when the shock is above predicted. Because this trend 
follows suit for all variables, it suggests that above trend shocks produce slightly larger 
asymmetric effects for states. 
  
6. Conclusion and Implications 
 This paper has extensively defined the process for setting interest rates, 
demonstrating that positive monetary policy shocks impact all state economies in a 
negative manner. Further, we provide evidence that these effects are widely varied 
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throughout states, with substantive and significant differences between the impacts of 
monetary surprise shocks on state economic activity growth. While predecessors assumed 
that these differences could be explained through the relative importance of interest rate- 
dependent sectors in the state, we are unable to find significant evidence in support of 
these hypotheses. Instead, the asymmetries can be better explained through geographic 
clustering, indicated that the similarities and differences between these state responses 
cannot be explained through the channels heretofore presented. Finally, this paper 
concludes that increasing monetary surprise produces more harmful effects when the 
contraction occurs in a period in which the interest rate is already higher than expected.  
 Our empirical methods make important contributions because we are able to use a 
flexible panel model that draws conclusions counter to ones that other economists have 
made concerning the causes of asymmetries in their local projection evaluations. Other 
studies have failed to model the statistical interaction between variables and state 
composition and monetary surprise, instead relying on alternative evaluation. Therefore, 
our findings are more robust and ignore the coincidental correlation connecting states that 
generate strong reactions. 
 The asymmetric responses among states also bring in to question whether the 
United States is an ideal currency union, due to differences in state economies and state 
responses to policy shocks. One paper viewed state asymmetric effects through this lens 
and determined that 15 states would benefit from having their own currency and setting 
policy in a way that was different from the aggregate level (Beckworth, 2009). While it is 
unlikely that we break from a common currency, since my results point to geographic 
clustering of responses, this lends support to explore the potential of allowing district 
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banks to have a limited level of region-specific monetary control. With more monetary 
autonomy over discount windows, district banks could offset any aggregate policy that was 
inappropriate for their region. This structural shift in the Federal Reserve System would 
help to alleviate the pressure in states that are not best represented by aggregate economic 
measures. However, this action could be risky, leading to inter-regional rate competing. 
Regardless, it is a policy option that justifiably merits additional research. If states, 
especially those in high-response areas are especially worried about monetary policy shock 
sensitivity, they may choose to utilize fiscal policy as an alternative to counter aggregate 
policy mismatch. 
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Appendix A: Cited Figures and Tables 
Figure 1a. Forecasted Monetary Policy Rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Forecasted Monetary Policy Rule: Financial Crisis Period (Closer Look) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures graph the actual Federal Funds Rate against the predicted 
Psuedo Rate built using Equation 4. This model used a regression model from 1960-2007 
to forecast post-crisis values. 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to change in Monetary Policy 
 Notes: These graphs show impulse responses to an increase in monetary policy, 
constructed from a VAR model in Equation 6. 
 
Figure 3: Monetary Surprise 
 Notes: This graph is monetary surprise, the residual values of the VAR model in 
Equation 6. This measure is our main policy variable used in subsequent models. 
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Figure 4: Response Forecast, Tracing Monetary Shock on Economic Activity in Panel 
 
Notes: We generate an impulse response model of an increase in monetary surprise 
on state economic activity growth, forecasting the impact of a one-time shock forward by 
20 periods. We use the model indicated by Equation 8. 
 
 
Figure 5: Density Distribution of State Responses 
 
Notes: This graph depicts the distribution of monetary shock coefficients of each 
state. We run the model in Equation 9, and add interaction terms to the base monetary 
policy response. The total variance between states is 0.0069. The average state response is -
0.089. 
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Figure 6: Geographic Distribution of Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This graph geographically depicts the distribution of state responses to 
monetary policy shocks from Equation 9. All responses are negative and darker colors 
indicate larger, more negative responses. We created this map using targetmap.com.
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Table 1. Aggregate Variables: Unit Root Tests 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Transformation Test Statistic 
GDP Log differenced -10.876*** 
CPI (Inflation) Log differenced -5.563*** 
Government Spending Log differenced -12.886*** 
Money Supply Log differenced -8.156*** 
Unemployment Rate None -1.579 
Federal Funds Rate None -1.716 
   
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This table shows the test statistics for the Dickey-Fuller Test for the unit root. 
When the test statistic is greater than the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis that there is 
the presence of a unit root. When we can reject, that indicates that our data is stationary.  
 
Table 2. State Variables: Unit Root Tests 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Transformation Test Statistic 
Economic Activity Log differenced -24.6297*** 
Percent of Finance Earnings Centered on mean -3.6604*** 
Percent of Manufacturing Earnings Centered on mean -5.7293*** 
Percent of Agriculture Earnings Centered on mean -9.6377*** 
Percent Tax Burden Centered on mean -6.6240*** 
Percent Small Firms 
Percent Large Firms 
Centered on mean 
Centered on mean 
-10.1978*** 
-3.5499*** 
Unemployment Rate 
Personal Income per Capita 
None 
Log differenced 
-12.4974*** 
-38.4661*** 
CPI (Inflation) 
Monetary Policy Surprise 
Log differenced 
None 
-31.3757*** 
-58.7628*** 
   
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This table shows the test statistics for the Levin-Lin-Chu test for the unit root 
in panel data sets.  We choose this test because it allows for autocorrelation common to all 
panels and serial correlation. When the test statistic is greater than the critical value, we reject 
the null hypothesis that there is the presence of a unit root. When we can reject, that indicates 
that our data is stationary. 
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Table 3. Regression Output for Predictor Monetary Policy from 1960-2006 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. 
GDP   
t -0.072 (0.091) 
t-1  0.088 (0.094) 
t-2 -0.015 (0.091) 
t-3 -0.272*** (0.092) 
t-4 
Inflation 
-0.199** (0.079) 
 
t  0.543*** (0.155) 
t-1 -0.114 (0.182) 
t-2  0.374** (0.173) 
t-3 -0.039 (0.178) 
t-4 
Unemployment Rate 
 0.024 (0.165) 
 
t -1.769*** (0.284) 
t-1  1.221** (0.470) 
t-2  0.120 (0.493) 
t-3 -0.816* (0.474) 
t-4 
Federal Funds Rate 
 1.039*** (0.288) 
 
t-1  0.881*** (0.077) 
t-2 -0.288*** (0.103) 
t-3  0.330*** (0.104) 
t-4 
Government Spending 
t-1 
 0.017 
 
 0.026 
(0.078) 
 
(0.052) 
    
Constant  1.106*** (0.345) 
   
Observations  186  
R-squared  0.959  
   
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This regression comes from Equation 4. We consider these variables to be 
appropriate measures of policy because it matches theoretical assumptions, and it explains 
96% of the actual federal funds rate. A potential weakness is that it only includes macro 
variables instead of incorporating financial indicators. 
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Table 4: Vector Autoregressive Model of Macroeconomic Indicators 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
VARIABLES GDP Inflation   UR   M2 Pseudo Rate 
      
GDP      
t-1 0.100 -0.024 -0.085*** -0.026 0.312*** 
 (0.078) (0.048) (0.025) (0.076) (0.093) 
t-2 0.211*** -0.060 -0.087*** 0.095 0.126 
 (0.078) (0.048) (0.025) (0.076) (0.092) 
t-3 0.066 0.046 -0.033 0.123 -0.114 
 (0.079) (0.049) (0.026) (0.077) (0.094) 
t-4 0.080 0.104** -0.014 -0.075 -0.027 
 (0.070) (0.043) (0.023) (0.069) (0.084) 
Inflation      
t-1 -0.003 0.446*** 0.003 -0.069 0.122 
 (0.118) (0.073) (0.039) (0.115) (0.141) 
t-2 -0.034 0.056 -0.024 0.183 0.417*** 
 (0.126) (0.078) (0.041) (0.123) (0.150) 
t-3 -0.151 0.208*** 0.040 0.063 -0.122 
 (0.128) (0.079) (0.042) (0.125) (0.153) 
t-4 -0.097 0.016 0.011 0.045 0.051 
 (0.120) (0.074) (0.039) (0.117) (0.143) 
Unemployment Rate      
t-1 -0.665** -0.261 1.334*** 0.269 -0.452 
 (0.264) (0.162) (0.086) (0.257) (0.314) 
t-2 1.056** 0.564** -0.436*** -0.511 0.746 
 (0.411) (0.253) (0.134) (0.401) (0.489) 
t-3 -0.015 -0.105 0.031 0.327 -0.811 
 (0.417) (0.256) (0.136) (0.406) (0.496) 
t-4 -0.326 -0.199 0.023 -0.079 0.480* 
 (0.243) (0.150) (0.080) (0.237) (0.289) 
Money Supply      
t-1 0.125* 0.104** -0.026 0.377*** 0.140 
 (0.072) (0.044) (0.024) (0.070) (0.086) 
t-2 0.057 -0.015 -0.006 -0.005 0.008 
 (0.079) (0.049) (0.026) (0.077) (0.094) 
t-3 0.011 0.020 -0.001 0.059 -0.000 
 (0.078) (0.048) (0.025) (0.076) (0.093) 
t-4 -0.037 -0.007 0.022 0.209*** -0.052 
 (0.070) (0.043) (0.023) (0.068) (0.083) 
Pseudo Rate      
t-1 0.040 0.173*** -0.014 -0.199*** 1.101*** 
 (0.069) (0.042) (0.022) (0.067) (0.082) 
t-2 -0.244*** -0.098* 0.059** 0.142 -0.428*** 
 (0.092) (0.057) (0.030) (0.090) (0.110) 
t-3 0.295*** -0.025 -0.059* -0.002 0.377*** 
 (0.094) (0.058) (0.031) (0.091) (0.111) 
t-4 -0.087 -0.040 0.024 0.050 -0.133 
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 (0.069) (0.042) (0.023) (0.067) (0.082) 
Government Spending      
t 0.079* 0.029 0.014 0.024 -0.076 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.013) (0.039) (0.048) 
Constant -0.049 -0.062 0.377*** 0.268 -0.052 
 (0.274) (0.169) (0.090) (0.267) (0.326) 
      
Observations 221 221 221 221 221 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: This table produces VAR regression output from Equation 6. The rows are 
independent impulses, while the columns (1-5) are the dependent variable responses. 
Government Spending is exogenous, and is therefore only an input in the model, but not a 
response in the system. 
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Table 5: Baseline Model on Economic Activity Index 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. 
Monetary Surprise 
t-1 
Economic Activity 
 
-0.089*** 
 
(0.004) 
 
t-1  1.318*** (0.013) 
t-2 -0.708*** (0.021) 
t-3  0.376*** (0.021) 
t-4 
Percent of Finance 
-0.111*** (0.013) 
 
t-1          0.008 (0.013) 
t-2         -0.000 (0.017) 
t-3          0.019 (0.017) 
t-4 
Percent of Manufacturing 
        -0.028** (0.013) 
 
t-1 0.032*** (0.012) 
t-2        -0.014 (0.015) 
t-3         0.010 (0.014) 
t-4 
Percent of Agriculture 
       -0.022* (0.012) 
 
t-1        -0.021*** (0.008) 
t-2 0.026*** (0.010) 
t-3        -0.025*** (0.009) 
t-4 
Tax Burden 
0.019*** (0.007) 
 
t-1 -0.283*** (0.094) 
t-2          0.280 (0.190) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-3         -0.013 (0.190) 
t-4 
Percent of Small Firms 
         0.015 (0.094) 
 
t-1  0.678*** (0.090) 
t-2         -0.266 (0.171) 
t-3 -0.734*** (0.167) 
t-4 
Percent of Large Firms 
 0.352*** (0.086) 
 
t-1 -1.116*** (0.341) 
t-2  2.804*** (0.682) 
t-3 -3.158*** (0.680) 
t-4 
Inflation 
 1.511*** (0.340) 
 
t-1        -0.011* (0.006) 
t-2        -0.028*** (0.006) 
t-3        -0.023*** (0.007) 
t-4        -0.037*** (0.006) 
Constant        -2.656*** (0.382) 
   
Observations         5,936  
Number of states         48  
   
   
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This table produces regression output from 
Equation 9. 
 
 
Fite 47 
Table 6: Baseline Model on Economic Activity Index With State Interactions 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. 
Monetary Surprise  
t-1 
State Surprise Interaction Terms 
 
-0.076** 
 
(0.030) 
 
AL -0.041 (0.039) 
AR  0.050 (0.036) 
AZ  0.008 (0.046) 
CA  0.004 (0.036) 
CO -0.014 (0.037) 
CT  0.012 (0.035) 
DE -0.014 (0.042) 
FL (base) 
GA 
 0.000 
-0.016 
-0.097** 
-0.045 
 0.003 
-0.183*** 
-0.009 
-0.093** 
 0.066 
 0.066* 
 0.028 
-0.041 
-0.160* 
-0.003 
 0.014 
 0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
(0.040) 
(0.046) 
(0.051) 
(0.041) 
(0.054) 
(0.048) 
(0.042) 
(0.060) 
(0.037) 
(0.042) 
(0.053) 
(0.096) 
(0.035) 
(0.038) 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IA 
ID 
IL 
IN 
KS 
KY 
LA 
MA 
MD 
ME 
MI 
MN 
MO 
MS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MT 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
-0.057 
-0.052 
 0.018 
-0.020 
-0.006 
 0.030 
-0.056 
 0.002 
-0.273*** 
 0.071 
-0.118** 
-0.094** 
-0.054 
-0.087** 
-0.029 
-0.068* 
 0.031 
-0.008 
-0.015 
-0.108** 
 0.006 
-0.008 
-0.381*** 
-0.094 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.061) 
(0.041) 
(0.048) 
(0.042) 
(0.043) 
(0.037) 
(0.040) 
(0.053) 
(0.035) 
(0.064) 
(0.052) 
(0.059) 
(0.043) 
(0.047) 
(0.044) 
(0.044) 
(0.037) 
(0.037) 
(0.035) 
(0.040) 
(0.054) 
(0.036) 
(0.043) 
(0.115) 
(0.087) 
NC 
ND 
NE 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NV 
NY 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VA 
VT 
WA 
WI 
WV 
WY 
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Economic Activity 
t-1  1.302*** (0.013) 
t-2 -0.689*** (0.021) 
t-3  0.369*** (0.020) 
t-4 
Percent of Finance 
-0.107*** (0.013) 
 
t-1  0.008 (0.013) 
t-2  0.000 (0.017) 
t-3  0.019 (0.017) 
t-4 
Percent of Manufacturing 
-0.029** (0.013) 
 
t-1  0.033*** (0.012) 
t-2 -0.013 (0.014) 
t-3  0.008 (0.014) 
t-4 
Percent of Agriculture 
-0.021* (0.012) 
 
t-1 -0.022*** (0.008) 
t-2  0.027*** (0.010) 
t-3 -0.025*** (0.009) 
t-4 
Tax Burden 
 0.019*** (0.007) 
 
t-1 -0.275*** (0.093) 
t-2  0.259 (0.185) 
t-3 -0.011 (0.185) 
t-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.027 (0.093) 
 
 
Percent of Small Firms 
t-1  0.695*** (0.088) 
t-2 -0.284* (0.167) 
t-3 -0.719*** (0.163) 
t-4 
Percent of Large Firms 
 0.340*** (0.085) 
 
t-1 -1.043*** (0.337) 
t-2  2.680*** (0.668) 
t-3 -3.146*** (0.666) 
t-4 
Inflation 
 1.551*** (0.337) 
 
t-1 -0.011* (0.006) 
t-2 -0.029*** (0.006) 
t-3 -0.023*** (0.006) 
t-4 -0.037*** (0.006) 
 
Constant -2.665*** (0.384) 
   
Observations 5,936  
Number of stateid 48  
   
   
   
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table produces regression output from 
Equation 10.
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Table 7: Modeling Potential Asymmetric Causes 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. 
Monetary Surprise   
t-1 -0.107*** (0.010) 
Surprise Interactions   
Composition   
Finance 0.003 (0.003) 
Manufacturing 0.002*** (0.001) 
Agriculture 0.010*** (0.003) 
Tax Burden -0.000 (0.005) 
Small Firms 0.005 (0.005) 
Large Firms -0.008 (0.009) 
Geography (Base Southeast)   
Far West 0.011 (0.017) 
Great Lakes -0.060** (0.025) 
Mideast 0.018 (0.019) 
New England 0.031* (0.019) 
Plains 0.006 (0.015) 
Rocky Mountain 0.033* (0.017) 
Southeast (base) 0.000 (0.000) 
Southwest 0.083*** (0.019) 
Economic Activity   
t-1 1.371*** (0.013) 
t-2 -0.718*** (0.022) 
t-3 0.372*** (0.021) 
t-4 -0.091*** (0.013) 
Percent Finance   
t-1 0.033** (0.013) 
t-2 0.004 (0.018) 
t-3 0.012 (0.018) 
t-4 -0.049*** (0.014) 
 
 
 
  
Percent Manufacturing 
t-1 -0.027** (0.012) 
t-2 -0.023 (0.015) 
t-3 0.017 (0.015) 
t-4 0.034*** (0.012) 
Percent Agriculture   
t-1 -0.024*** (0.008) 
t-2 0.026*** (0.010) 
t-3 -0.027*** (0.010) 
t-4 0.023*** (0.007) 
Tax Burden   
t-1 -0.191** (0.097) 
t-2 0.223 (0.195) 
t-3 0.058 (0.194) 
t-4 -0.089 (0.097) 
Percent of Small Firms   
t-1 0.820*** (0.092) 
t-2 -0.448** (0.175) 
t-3 -0.581*** (0.172) 
t-4 0.222** (0.090) 
Percent of Large Firms   
t-1 -0.982*** (0.348) 
t-2 2.763*** (0.696) 
t-3 -2.753*** (0.694) 
t-4 0.995*** (0.346) 
Inflation   
t-1 0.013** (0.007) 
t-2 0.008 (0.007) 
t-3 0.005 (0.007) 
t-4 -0.012** (0.006) 
Observations 5,936  
Number of states 48  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This table produces regression output from Equation 11.
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Table 8: Modeling Asymmetric Causes by Shock Type 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. 
Monetary Surprise   
t-1 -0.104*** (0.014) 
Above Trend (intercept) 0.097*** (0.009) 
Surprise Interactions if Below Predicted   
Shock Type = Below Predicted 0.000 (0.000) 
Composition   
Finance 0.004 (0.004) 
Manufacturing 0.001 (0.001) 
Agriculture 0.009** (0.004) 
Tax Burden -0.010 (0.007) 
Small Firms -0.004 (0.007) 
Large Firms -0.025** (0.012) 
Geography (Base Southeast)   
Far West 0.007 (0.021) 
Great Lakes -0.051* (0.031) 
Mideast 0.037 (0.024) 
New England 0.036 (0.024) 
Plains -0.002 (0.019) 
Rocky Mountain 0.034 (0.022) 
Southeast (base) 0.000 (0.000) 
Southwest 0.063*** (0.024) 
Surprise Interactions if Above Predicted   
Shock Type = Above Predicted -0.103*** (0.025) 
Composition   
Finance -0.001 (0.005) 
Manufacturing 0.005*** (0.001) 
Agriculture 0.013** (0.005) 
Tax Burden 0.015 (0.009) 
Small Firms 0.013 (0.010) 
Large Firms 0.010 (0.017) 
Geography (Base Southeast)   
Far West 0.023 (0.028) 
Great Lakes -0.081** (0.041) 
Mideast 0.011 (0.032) 
New England 0.036 (0.031) 
Plains 0.015 (0.028) 
Rocky Mountain 0.037 (0.030) 
Southeast (base) 0.000 (0.000) 
Southwest 0.107*** (0.032) 
Economic Activity   
t-1 1.371*** (0.013) 
t-2 -0.747*** (0.022) 
t-3 0.395*** (0.021) 
t-4 -0.100*** (0.013) 
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Percent Finance 
  
t-1 0.026** (0.013) 
t-2 0.002 (0.018) 
t-3 0.006 (0.018) 
t-4 -0.032** (0.014) 
Percent Manufacturing   
t-1 0.001 (0.012) 
t-2 -0.038** (0.015) 
t-3 0.012 (0.015) 
t-4 0.026** (0.012) 
Percent Agriculture   
t-1 -0.023*** (0.008) 
t-2 0.023** (0.010) 
t-3 -0.030*** (0.010) 
t-4 0.026*** (0.007) 
Tax Burden   
t-1 -0.210** (0.096) 
t-2 0.199 (0.196) 
t-3 0.124 (0.195) 
t-4 -0.118 (0.096) 
Percent of Small Firms   
t-1 0.745*** (0.091) 
t-2 -0.349** (0.176) 
t-3 -0.706*** (0.174) 
t-4 0.322*** (0.089) 
Percent of Large Firms   
t-1 -0.947*** (0.344) 
t-2 2.547*** (0.697) 
t-3 -2.654*** (0.697) 
t-4 1.073*** (0.345) 
Inflation   
t-1 0.018*** (0.007) 
t-2 0.003 (0.007) 
t-3 0.009 (0.007) 
t-4 -0.015** (0.006) 
   
Observations 5,936  
Number of states 48  
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: This table shows regression output from Equation 12.  
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics  
Aggregate Variables:  
Federal Funds Rate     Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP       GDP- Stationary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPI       CPI- Stationary 
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Government Spending    Government Spending-Stationary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M2       M2- Stationary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These graphs contain summary statistics for all aggregate indicators used in our 
model. The data all comes from FRED measured from 1960-2015. For federal funds rate 
and unemployment rate, we only display the actual rates. For GDP, CPI, government 
spending and money supply, we show both the raw series and the stationary series. The 
stationary series were made stationary by log differencing the indicators. We use these 
stationary series in our analysis. 
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State-Level Variables:  
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Notes: These graphs are summary statistics for state-level variables that are used within 
the state-level model. For each indicator, the left graph represents a time series depicting 
the average amongst all states in order to see the general trend across time. On the right, 
we take the same indicator and show the distribution between states in given years in 
order to capture inter-state differences. Most variables are measured from 1970-2015. We 
use most of these indicators in our state-level panel model.  
 
